Matt was ill-prepared when Stephen Port started killing gays – and still is | Matt Parr

BStephen Port drugged, sexually assaulted and killed four young gay men in east London between June 2014 and September 2015, leading to a police response that was criticized by the coroner for a number of “very serious and very simple investigative shortcomings“. Eight years after Port killed his last victim, what has changed in the way the Metropolitan Police can deal with similar circumstances? I’ve looked into it and a sad answer is not enough.

What happened remains shocking. There was Anthony Walgate Porto’s first victim. He was found dead outside the block of flats where Port lived after Port called 999 to say he had found a young man passed out. Anthony died of an overdose of GHB, sometimes called the “date-rape” drug.

Porto’s next three victims, Gabriel Kovari, Daniel Whitworth and Jack Taylor, were all found in a churchyard near Port’s flat. Like Anthony, they all consumed lethal levels of GHB.

The similarities were strikingly obvious, but the Met failed to establish that the deaths could be related – or even that the four men had been killed.

Port eventually admitted that he had been meeting Anthony for sex. He claimed that it was Anthony who administered the drugs and that he panicked when he found him dead and took his body outside. It is hard to believe that the police took Porto’s version of events as the truth, when the circumstances should certainly have raised the alarm.

It is entirely possible that Gabriel, Daniel and Jack would be alive if the police had conducted a professional and thorough investigation into Anthony’s death. This injustice must be unbearably difficult for the families of the victims. Adding insult to injury, the Met’s engagement with families has been inattentive and, at times, virtually non-existent. It was the persistence of the families that eventually led to Port being identified as a suspect.

The families of Port’s victims have accused the Met of homophobia. We understand why. We also understand their desire to understand the deaths of their loved ones, which could have been completely prevented.

In fact, the police did not initially realize that each victim was gay. This does not excuse their failure. But by the time they admitted the men were gay, the investigation was doomed. Almost immediately, without questioning or curiosity, officers on the front lines decided that every death was due to drug overdose. The death was not recorded as suspicious. This mistake was critical and hard to forgive. This influenced everything that followed. This meant that homicide specialists were not involved and local officers did not even consider the possibility of a serial killer.

The Met apologized to the families. But in the hope that lessons can be learned, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Police and Fire and Rescue Services has examined what happened next. We believe the Met has not learned enough from its failure in the Porto case – and it could happen again. Most worryingly, the officers admitted to us that they are still hoping for luck to determine the connection between the deaths.

Our report describes a police force struggling to overcome deep-seated problems with competence and professionalism. We regularly hear that the Met lacks experience and that its resources are stretched, which we accept. But this does not absolve the Met of its responsibility to meet the basic requirements.

We have identified five issues that we believe most convincingly explain why the Metropolitan’s handling of the Porto case was fundamentally flawed.

First, inadequate training is given to inexperienced police officers who respond to deaths, and not enough is done to instill in officers an investigative mindset.

Second, the poor supervision and control of these same officers. A senior supervisor must attend all sudden death reports. But we’ve found that it’s common for supervisors to step in or be temporarily promoted by sergeants rather than seniors.

Third, we found record-keeping, confusing record-keeping systems, and mishandling of property and exhibits unacceptable. Combined, these issues can lead to confusion, duplication, and wasted time.

Fourth, the Met has a huge number of confusing policies and guidelines.

And fifth, we found inadequate intelligence and crime analysis processes that make it difficult for police to link deaths at the local level.

The Met made some improvements after Port was finally charged with four murders in 2015; these include improving collaboration between local officers and specialist homicide teams, as well as training and guidance for homicide officers chemical sex. We welcome these changes, but the force has still not done enough.

Confidence in Met questions. It is the UK’s largest police force and for many it is the face of British policing. And it desperately needs to recruit quality people – from across London’s communities – and retain the good ones currently working.

To start rebuilding public trust, the Met must immediately implement the 20 recommendations we have made. These include improving how the police investigate deaths and how they support victims’ families. Frontline officers who respond to deaths must make better use of available intelligence. Indeed, we are calling on all police chiefs to use this as an opportunity to review the way they investigate deaths.

If the police are willing to learn from past failures, they will be much better equipped to protect the public from predators like Stephen Port. This should be a priority. No other family should have to experience this injustice again.